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C

riminal law always has rec-

ognized that persons who
do not actually engage in
the conduct necessary to
the commission of a crime may nevertheless incur some criminal liability if
they contribute in certain ways to the
planning, encouragement or execution
of the crime.' Hence, the hiring party
as well as the contract killer may be
guilty of murder; the getaway driver as
well as the robber may be guilty of robbery; and the fence as well as the thief
may be guilty of theft.2 Colorado provides that the guilt of the party who
does not actually commit the crime is
equal to that of the party who does,
provided the former's contribution to
the crime satisfies the principles of accomplice liability.3
The law of accomplice liability also is
known as the law of complicity or of accountability. Because an individual convicted as an accessory faces precisely
the same punishment as one convicted
of the same crime as a principal, 4 it is
imperative that Colorado attorneys understand the law of accomplice liability.

Statutory Background
CRS § 18-1-602(1) provides:
(1) A person is legally accountable
for the behavior of another if:

Column Ed.: H. Patrick Furman
of the University of Colorado
School ofLaw, Boulder-492-8126

(a) He is made accountable for the
conduct of that person by the
statute defining the offense or by
specific provision of this code; or
(b) He acts with the culpable mental
state sufficient for the commission of the offense in question
and he causes an innocent person to engage in such behavior.
The second method [in (1)(b)] of establishing vicarious liability for the conduct of another is seldom invoked.5 It is
more common for cases of alleged accomplice liability to fall within subsection (1)(a), according to which the accused accomplice "is made accountable
for the conduct of [the actor] by the
statute defining the offense or by specific provision of [the Colorado Criminal
Code]." Further, in practically every reported case, the source of the defendant's accountability is not the statute
defining the offense, but rather "specific
provisions" of CRS § 18-1-603:
A person is legally accountable as
principal for the behavior of another
constituting a criminal offense if,
with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense, he
aids, abets, or advises the other person in planning or committing the offense.
This apparently simple language conceals some uncertainty about exactly
what is required for accomplice liability
under its provisions. Employing the
usual dichotomy of acts and mental
states, questions might be asked about
(1) the conduct necessary to convict an

individual as an accomplice and (2) the
mental state or states necessary for
such a conviction.

The "Act" of Complicity
CRS § 18-1-603's designation of "aiding, abetting, or advising" as the possible varieties of complicitous acts by no
means eliminates the uncertainties of
the matter of conduct. It has been held
that the term "abets" encompasses encouragement.6 Thus, in Colorado, an individual who sells a would-be criminal
an instrumentality that is necessary or
useful to the commission of the crime
may well have committed an act of complicity.
In a case that predates the present
statute but appears to reflect the Colorado view of complicity, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that an innkeeper
who rented rooms to prostitutes could
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be guilty of keeping and maintaining a
house of ill-fame. According to the
court, such conduct constituted "aiding,
abetting, and assisting" such an enterprise. If this case is still good law, it is
difficult to distinguish the tolerant
innkeeper from an individual who sells
a firearm to a bank robber or sells a
can of gasoline to an arsonist.
Distinctions may be made between
various cases of aid by considering differences between the mental states of
the various aiders. This consideration,
however, requires an understanding of
what mental state or states are necessary to the commission of a crime as an
accomplice.

The "Mens Rea"
Of Complicity
CRS § 18-1-603 designates the mental state necessary for accomplice liability as "intent to promote or facilitate
the commission of the offense." As it
has been interpreted in Colorado, this
language is somewhat ambiguous. It
seems at a minimum that an individual
could not be guilty of an offense as an
accomplice unless he or she had every
mental state necessary to the commission of the offense as a principal. For
example, to the extent an offense requires knowledge of a circumstance, an
individual could not be guilty of the offense as an accomplice without having
known of the circumstance at the time
of furnishing aid or encouragement.
The only Colorado decision that
seems to cast any doubt on this proposition is People v. Simien.8 In Simien,
the trial court neglected to instruct the
jury in the elements of accomplice liability, but told it that the defendant
could only be convicted if he had every
mental state necessary to commit the
crime as a principal. The Court of Appeals found no plain error in the trial
court's having failed to instruct the jury
in the elements of accomplice liability,
in light of its other mental state instruc tion.
The opinion in Simien seems to suggest that the error, if any, inured to the
defendant's benefit.9 This suggestion, if
taken seriously, could lead to the conclusion that an individual may sometimes be convicted as an accomplice
without evidence that he or she had the
mens rea necessary to commit the offense. Nevertheless, this proposition is
only vaguely hinted at and is contrary
to other precedentso and to common
sense.
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Assuming that an individual must
display every mental state necessary to
the commission of the offense in order
to be convicted as an accomplice, the
question remains whether anything
more is required. Arguably, "intention
to promote or facilitate" means that
something more may be required, at
least where the crime committed by the
principal is one of knowledge, recklessness or negligence, rather than one of
intention.
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under the Criminal Code's definitions of
the various culpable mental states. Affirming the adjudication of delinquency,
the majority held that the instructions
did not offend the principle that a judge
should instruct on the meaning of every
mental state that is an element of the
offense. The court observed that complicity is not itself an offense, but rather a
theory of liability for some offense defined elsewhere in the Code. It then
held that the term "intent" in the
phrase "intent to promote or facilitate
the commission of the offense" does not
necessarily mean the same thing that
"Distinctions may be made
the phrase "intent" would mean in the
between various cases of aid definition of a crime-that is, a conscious objective to cause a particular reby considering differences
sult. 14
between the mental states
What alternative meaning the term
"intent to promote or facilitate the comof the various aiders."
mission of an offense" might have was
not addressed by the R.V court. The
opinion stated that the phrase was not
For example, an individual may com- composed of "words of uncommon
mit fourth-degree arson as a principal meaning which are apt to be misunderwith a mental state of recklessness (to- stood by a jury and therefore require
ward the possibility that he or she is further definition."
creating a danger of death, injury or
The R.V decision, then, rejected the
damage)." It seems to strain the mean- dissenters' view that conviction for coming of the intent language, however, to plicity necessarily requires "a purposive
suggest that an equally reckless indi- attitude or conscious objective on the
vidual who furnishes a match to such a part of the offender towards the complecareless arsonist may be convicted as tion of the crime." 6 The less culpable or
an accomplice to fourth-degree arson. If less purposive attitude toward the
the match-supplier is merely careless completion of the crime that might sufabout the prospect of destruction by fice was hinted at in the Colorado
fire, it is difficult at best to say that he Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Peoor she has "intention to promote or fa- ple v. Krovarz.17
cilitate the commission of" fourth-deIn Krovarz, the issue was similar to
gree arson.
that in R.V: whether the trial judge's
To equate the alleged accomplice's instructions concerning the definition of
recklessness to "intention" is to erase a particular mental state were adethe careful distinctions between the quate. The basis of the charge in Krovarious mental states that the Colorado varz, however, was attempt rather than
Criminal Code sets forth. 12 Prior to re- complicity. The court recognized that atcent Colorado decisions, it seemed clear tempt, like complicity, is not a crime in
that an individual could not be convict- the abstract but can create liability only
ed as an accomplice to any crime unless in conjunction with some other offense
he or she intended every consequential defined by the Criminal Code."' The atelement of the crime. This logical con- tempt statute by its language required
clusion, however, has been rejected by proof of "purpose to complete the comthe Colorado courts, as discussed in the mission of the offense," and the court
following section.
earlier had held that "purpose" in that
context has the same meaning as "inComplicity in
tent."9 Nevertheless, in Krovarz the
Colorado Cases
court held that proof that the actor
In People v. R.V.," the Colorado knew his conduct would result in the
Supreme Court reviewed a delinquency completed offense is sufficient for conadjudication for the juvenile's complici- viction of attempt. In other words, the
ty in a theft. The trial judge had re- court ruled that in the context of an atfused to instruct the jury in the mean- tempt charge, knowledge is as good as
ing of "intentionally or with intent" intent.
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In a later case concerning the law of
attempt, the court pushed that reasoning even further. In People v. Thompson,20 the court held that a person may
be convicted of attempting a crime of
recklessness if that person "intends to
engage in acts or conduct that produce
a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
death of another." Significantly, this formulation does not require that the
actor intend to cause the consequential
element of the crime attempted. The relaxation of the mental state requirement for attempts in Krovarz and
Thompson presaged a similar loosening
of the law of accomplice liability.
When the precise question of the
mental state required for accomplice liability for a non-specific intent crime
came before the Colorado Supreme
Court recently, its ruling was even
more surprising. In People v. Wheeler,21
a 1989 decision, the court held that a
person may be guilty of aiding and
abetting the crime of negligent homicide even if that person has neither intention nor knowledge that the victim
will die as a result of the principal's
conduct. It is sufficient, said the court,
that defendant intend to promote or facilitate the acts or conduct of the principal; it is not necessary that the defendant's mental state be greater than
negligence toward the consequence of
death.22 This decision probably suggests
the end, in Colorado, of any distinction
between the mental state necessary to
commit a crime as a principal and that
necessary to commit the same crime as
an accomplice.

Evidence of Complicity
It has been held that an alleged accomplice may not be convicted without
evidence that the principal actually
committed the crime.n It is no defense
to a charge of complicity, however, that
the alleged principal was never prosecuted for the crime, or even that he or
she was acquitted of it.24 Courts occasionally will say that mere presence at
the scene of a crime is by itself insufficient to establish accomplice liability?
Nevertheless, is is apparently unnecessary to give such an instruction to the
jury if the other requirements of accomplice liability are the subject of a proper
instruction. 26
Furthermore, it may be possible to
convict a person on a showing that, although neither the individual nor his or
her confederate has committed all of
the acts necessary to constitute the
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crime, between the two of them each
conduct element of the crime is satisfied. In such a case (or in any case, it
seems) the prosecution is not required
to commit itself, either in its accusation
or in its evidence, to a view about which
actor is the principal and which is the
accomplice. 28 Indeed, according to the
Colorado courts, it is possible for a person to be charged as a principal and
convicted on a theory of complicity, or
vice versa, without any fatal variation
between the accusation and the proof.29

Exemptions, Exceptions and
Affirmative Defenses
CRS § 18-1-604 sets forth some exemptions from, or exceptions to, the general law of accomplice liability. In general, these exceptions conform to certain exceptions recognized by the common law of complicity.30 An individual
cannot be convicted as an accomplice to
a crime if he or she is "a victim" of that
crime.31 Hence, a minor could not be convicted as an accomplice to a sexual offense of which the minor was the victim, no matter how willing his or her
participation.
Somewhat more subtle is the exception for the defendant as to whom "the
offense is so defined that his conduct is
inevitably incidental to its commis-

sion.

For example, CRS § 18-7-205

prohibits "patronizing a prostitute," an
offense that is so defined that it cannot
be committed without the participation
of a prostitute. Because the prostitute's
conduct is "inevitably incidental" to the
commission of the offense by the patrons, he or she cannot be convicted as
an accomplice to their violations of § 187-205. (Prostitutes may, however, be liable as a principal for any crimes that
their own conduct may amount to, notably the crime of "prostitution" as defined in CRS § 18-7-201.)
CRS § 18-1-604(2) also creates an affirmative defense to charges of accomplice liability. It provides:
It shall be an affirmative defense to a
charge under section 18-1-603 if,
prior to the commission of the offense, the defendant terminated his
effort to promote or facilitate its commission and either gave timely warning to law enforcement authorities or
gave timely warning to the intended
victim.
Although there are no decisions in Colorado construing this provision, it
seems at least somewhat problematic.
As discussed above, persons need not be
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"charged" under CRS § 18-1-603 in
Relationship to
order to be convicted on principles of ac- Accessorial Liability
33
complice liability. This circumstance
leaves uncertain the issue of when a
The law of accomplice liability correjury should be instructed concerning sponds roughly to the common law of
the existence of this affirmative de- the liability of an "accessory before the
fense. In this author's opinion, a sensi- fact."3 5 At common law, liability also
ble rule would require instruction in could be imposed on accessories "after
this defense any time (1) the jury is in- the fact" who aided or harbored a felon
structed in the principles of accomplice with knowledge that he or she had comliability; and (2) there is some credible mitted a crime.36 In Colorado, the latter
evidence that the defendant can satisfy situation is addressed by the "Accessory
to Crime" statute, CRS § 18-8-105.x
the terms of the affirmative defense. 4
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Conclusion
The law of accomplice liability in Colorado is subtle and not always logical.
The feature that most distinguishes it
from the law of other jurisdictions is the
erosion of the requirement that an
aider and abetter must intend to cause
every consequential element of a crime
in order to be guilty as an accomplice.
This development makes the law of
complicity in Colorado more attractive
to the prosecutor, and a charge of complicity more difficult to defend against,
than is the case in most American jurisdictions.

NOTES
1. For a summary of the common law of
parties to crimes, see, State v. Powell, 83
S.E. 310, 313 (N.C. 1914).
2. See, People v. Lamirato, 504 P.2d 661
(Colo. 1972).
3. CRS §§ 18-1-601 to 18-1-603.
4. CRS H§ 18-1-601 and 18-1-603.
5. Despite the fact that it is seldom
used, this form of accountability may sometimes be important. In U.S. v. Bryan, 483
F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1973), the evidence suggested that the true criminal had induced another to pick up several hundred cases of stolen
liquor from a pier. The other individual was
acquitted, and the inducer argued that his
conviction should be overturned as well,
since an accomplice can be no more guilty
than the principal. The court rejected his argument, reasoning that the "innocent dupe"
still could be regarded as having committed
the crime, either as principal or as accomplice, because his physical conduct satisfied
the crime's definition, even if his mental
state did not (483 F.2d at 92). Had this case
arisen in Colorado, the inducer's guilt could
have been analyzed under the "innocent person" provision without any theoretical difficulty.
6. Alonzi v. People, 597 P.2d 560 (Colo.
1979).
7. Griffin v. People, 99 P. 321 (Colo.
1908).
8. 671 P.2d 1021 (ColoApp. 1983).
9. Id. at 1023.
10. See, e.g., People v. R.V, 635 P.2d 892
at n.2, 893 (Colo. 1981) (accused accomplice
is entitled to instruction on mental elements
of substantive crime he is claimed to have
aided or abetted).
11. CRS § 18-4-105.
12. Compare, CRS § 18-1-501(5) (definition of "intentionally" or "with intent") with,
CRS § 18-1-501(8) (definition of "recklessly").
13. Note 10, supra.
14. CRS § 18-1-501(5).
15. Note 13, supra, at 894.
16. Id.at 895 (Quinn, J., dissenting).
17. 697 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1985).
18. Id. at 380.
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19. People v. Frysig, 628 P.2d 1004 (Colo.
1981).
20. 729 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1986).
21. 772 P2d 101 (Colo. 1989).
22. Id.
23. People v. Martin,561 P.2d 776 (Colo.

1977).
24. CRS § 18-1-605.
25. See, e.g., Quintana v. People, 102 P.2d

486 (Colo. 1940).
26. Note 8, supra.
27. Reed v. People, 467 P.2d 809 (Colo.

1970).
28. People v. Scheidt, 513 P.2d 446 (Colo.

1973).
29. People v. Mason, 642 P.2d 8 (Colo.

charged as accomplice, convicted as principal).
30. See, Lafave and Scott, CriminalLaw

594-96 (2d ed. 1986).
31. CRS § 18-1-604(1).
32. Id.

33. See, note 29, supra and accompanying text.
34. See, CRS § 18-1-407.
35. See, Perkins and Boyce, Criminal
Law 722 (3d ed. 1982).
36. Id.

37. For a discussion of this statute, see,
Wesson, Crimes and Defenses in Colorado

(Norcross, GA: Harrison Publishing Co.,
1989).
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